求助翻译!!!急!!

CHINA’S NEW REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
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4 Q/ @& ^2 j5 W5 b* ^5 YABSTRACT2 U* U, L  \7 p2 q

: q. @8 \* f( S) J5 P0 }This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade2 Y! P# t* e/ U. ?
bloc centred on them.5 t/ P, }  C, q9 v& f
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1.   Introduction( C( r% `( o. H
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Most of the recent discussion of Chinese trade policy from outside China has
0 R$ d9 s- p4 v+ V) dbeen of China's WTO accession, assessing both the commitments themselves and the process of implementation (Bhattasali, Li, and Martin (2004), Whalley (2003)). Less attention has been given to the network of post WTO accession regional trade agreements that China is now in the process of negotiating. Agreements, or initial frameworks of agreements are now in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand. Discussions on possible FTAs with India, Chile, Singapore, South Africa, the Gulf Cooperation Council are underway. Possible direct or indirect arrangements involving Korea and Japan are the subject of speculation. Thus, what we may be witnessing with China's new regional trade agreements is the emergence of a third wave of large power regional agreements which will likely set the precedent for other Chinese regional agreements to follow in future years.
: Z6 J; L& G4 l" f5 FChina, like other large powers in the trading system (the US and the EU) has
. Y  K6 S8 ?2 `$ cclear incentive to commit to multilateral disciplines in the WTO as a way of gaining non discriminatory access to large markets and head off discrimination against her either in both these or smaller third country markets by fellow large powers. But closer to home (and as with the US and the EU) China has equally clear incentive to negotiate supplemental regional arrangements which deal with interests in local markets in ways which go beyond WTO disciplines. The US with NAFTA, and the EU with accession and other agreements have encountered similar incentives with similar results.0 O6 N9 h- t( C6 D0 w
But there are several striking features of China's emerging network of4 }" M+ b4 c# u" n/ I5 k" F0 K
agreements which differentiate it both from to the one off negotiation of NAFTA by the US in 1991 and the process of ever deeper EU integration initiated by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The first is the diversity of these agreements, both in form and coverage. For example, the agreement with Hong Kong is concrete and focused on both goods trade and cross border investment and financial activities, while the agreements with Australia and New Zealand are largely general indicative statements of intent in much wider number of areas. Diversity of approach while it seems to be the hallmark potentially makes the later emergence of an Asian trade bloc centred on these agreements more problematical.
2 E* v" B8 O" E5 R4 LA second feature is their seeming brevity, and hence the inevitably vagueness/ b- B+ Z- {* l8 T
of the texts involved (the Hong Kong and Macao Closer Economic Partnership7 {" @4 T, o1 ?( U: {5 ?
Agreements (CEPA) have only thirteen pages of main text with additional annexes). Much seems to be left to subsequent joint agreement and mutual management of the trade relationship. A third feature is the absence (unlike especially the US agreements) of explicit and clear dispute resolution procedures with conciliation between the parties being relied upon. Other features are extensive lists of specific bilateral commitments in services (especially in the case of CEPA) which go beyond the form and type of commitments undertaken by most WTO members in the GATS. Another( X( f# a; s) v0 U* |* j( i4 M
is extensive attention devoted to arrangements both for joint ventures and the
3 j3 m. s, o9 P* }; d4 l+ o  qoperation of financial institutions in a joint regulatory environment in the Hong Kong Arrangement." h" N  E/ E  Y
The focus of recent US bilateral initiatives seemingly on gaining unilateral. p5 B/ W: r1 O0 G
access for key service sectors in partner countries in return for accelerated bilateral tariff elimination (see Schott (2004)), and of recent EU bilaterals on wider diplomatic linkage to trade and competition policy (see Brenton (2002)) find no parallels in these emerging Chinese agreements. Instead, the emphasis for now is primarily on trade access for manufactures through bilateral tariff reduction/elimination and bilaterally scheduled commitments in services.
$ ?6 b; _( Z0 l" c: uThe majority of literature on regional trade agreements from economists6 z$ F2 ~" Q" `
continues to treat them all as relatively similar in structure, despite the fact that the reality is quite different. Here a third set of agreements, further differentiated from the already different US and EU regional agreements, seem to characterize early Chinese regional negotiation, and more agreements seem likely to follow. We first discuss the Hong Kong CEPA agreement, next the China-ASEAN agreement, and the Australia, New Zealand agreements, and then what seems to be emerging on other fronts. We conclude with a discussion of what the Chinese interest may be in further elaborating this network of treaty arrangements in the future.
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